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# BOOK REVIEWS.

ELEMENTS OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION. Part II. Ontological; Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered Before the University of Edinburgh in 1898. By *C. P. Tiele*, Theol. D.; Litt. D. (Bonon.); Hon. M. R. A. S., etc., Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion in the University of Leyden. In two volumes. Vol. II. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1899. Pages, vi, 286. Price, 7s. 6d.

This second volume of Prof. C. P. Tiele's *Elements of the Science of Religion* is one of the most important books written on the subject. It contains a philosophy of religion which reflects the mature opinion of a philosopher and at the same time gives an appreciation of man's religious attitude such as can be acquired only by personal experience.

All the most important problems of religion are touched upon, its essence (Chapter VIII), its constituents, i. e., its essential features (Chapter I), its origin (Chapter IX), its place in man's spiritual life (Chapter X) and its relation to philosophy (Chapter III). Special chapters are devoted to religious manifestations, worship, prayers and offering (VI), and to religion as an institution, i. e., the Church (VII), further to faith (VI), to the constant element in all conceptions of God (IV), and the relationship between God and man (V).

While we fully agree with the spirit in which Professor Tiele treats the subject and also in the main with his conclusions, we would in some places suggest other terms, which in our opinion would be more striking and comprehensive. Professor Tiele, for instance, regards piety as the abiding characteristic of all religion, considering the Dutch *vroom*, the German *fromm* and the Latin *pius* as practically of the same significance, which expresses "devotion, or consecration," because "it involves the idea of self-dedication and personal sacrifice." But the essence of piety according to Professor Tiele is adoration, and therefore he adds, "the essence of religion is adoration. . . . To adore is to love 'with all one's heart and soul and mind and strength.' To adore is to give oneself with all that one has and holds dearest." We cannot help thinking that this definition is not comprehensive enough and would exclude not only those lower religions which have not as yet a conception of a Deity that deserves adoration, but also the philosophical atheist who re-

jects adoration as unworthy of man. Is for instance Schopenhauer irreligious, or to take a still more flagrant example, is Nietzsche irreligious? In our conception Nietzsche's philosophy (considered purely in its results) is irreligious, as subverting the very basis of all religion, but the instinct that prompted him to write, to denounce morality, to preach the over-man, are decidedly of a religious nature. Yet there is no adoration, there is no self-sacrifice; there is, on the contrary, a bold self-assertion, which stands in a conscious opposition to devotion, to consecration, to self-sacrifice. We propose to replace Professor Tiele's definition of religion as "piety or adoration" by the broader term "conviction." Religion comprises the whole man; it is (as Professor Tiele recognises) emotional in its nature but it is an emotion of definite coloring, which it receives from its intellectual ingredients, consisting of a conception of the world, life's destiny, and duties, etc., etc. An opinion (be it scientific knowledge or mere belief, or a superstition) which ensouls a man as a sentiment prompting him to act in a definite way, is called conviction, and we shall find that conviction is the essential feature of all religions, true as well as false, barbarous as well as civilised, dogmatic as well as scientific or philosophical.

We trust that Professor Tiele would not be disinclined to such a substitution of definitions, for the detailed explanations in which he leads up to his results are the best evidence that he attacks the religious problems in the same spirit as we. What he says, for instance, concerning "the husk and the kernel" (pp. 182 ff.) in appreciating as well as criticising Professor Siebeck is very good and commendable; and so are his remarks regarding the various views concerning the origin of religion. Religion does not originate from morality, it is not a product of reasoning, it is not due to the ideal of perfection; nor is it the yearning of the finite for the infinite; and we expect Professor Tiele to add that religion is always from the most rudimentary beginnings and superstitious customs down to the most recent expressions of philosophers a passion for living up to one's deepest conviction; but Professor Tiele declares "The origin of religion consists in the fact that man has the Infinite within him even before he is himself conscious of it and whether he recognises it or not." Professor Tiele acknowledges that "the doctrine of conscience and sense of duty urgently requires revision," and we have attempted the task in *The Ethical Problem.*[1] We cannot enter here into the details of how conscience originates as a complexus of motor ideas, all of them being the composite traces of former impressions, inherited tendencies, instructions, experiences, etc.; but the result is a conviction which asserts itself not always in logical arguments but frequently with the impetuosity of an emotion. Man's conscience is the organ of our religious life, because conscience is conviction.

Professor Tiele finds that the root-idea in every conception of God-head is

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[1] See the chapters "The Growth of Conscience," pp. 119–124: "The 'Is' and the 'Ought,'" pp. 279–284; and "An Analysis of the Moral Ought," pp. 285–295.

power (p. 81), and deems it hardly necessary to add that "in order to stamp a superhuman power as a deity, it should be worthy of adoration."

"Men worship that only which they deem above them. Not the beast of prey, whose claws make them tremble, nor the bloodthirsty tyrant who persecutes them, but those beings alone whom they judge superior to man.

"The power of the evil spirits is indeed greater than their own, but not superhuman, although perhaps we may call it supersensual. The Zarathustrian erects no altars to Ahriman, nor does the mediæval Christian build chapels for Satan, however much they may dread these spirits. The Mohammedan casts stones at Iblis, and our Christian forefathers delighted in popular tales in which the devil was tricked or held up to derision. But to a power which he regards as superhuman man looks up with awe, and he speaks of it with reverence."

This distinction between good and evil powers that are more powerful than man is hardly sufficient, and yet we are inclined to endorse Tiele's view that power alone is sufficient as the characteristic feature of Divinity. But we must bear in mind that power is here used in a specific sense; it is not physical energy, but signifies that which will abide. We may call truth a power in this sense; and also right, justice, righteousness, love, good-will, and even such things as knowledge. The tiger, the tyrant, and other evils which may be conceived as demoniacal, are powers of another kind. They are strength that asserts itself in contradiction to the universal order of nature; they are temporary disturbances only which, when their day has passed away, will have the curse of condemnation imprinted on them. The sway of right and justice is more enduring than physical power; it is that which keeps man in agreement with the cosmic law of the interrelations of living beings.

God is the standard of right. God is not "moral" himself, morality does not apply to him. Individual beings only, God's creatures, are moral or immoral, according to their behavior. If they act in accord with the norm of truth and right they are moral; otherwise they are immoral, and it is this norm which we call God.

God represents the authority of the moral "ought." Thus it happens that the savage's god is as savage as are his ideas of morality. His immoral immolations are, closely judged, moral actions. Thus Professor Tiele is right when he says:

"It is not until a late period that the religiously disposed man strives to ex-
"press the superhuman character of his gods by ascribing to them ethical attri-
"butes. They become the vindicators of law, the rewarders of virtue, the punish-
"ers of vice."

This is simply the result of a finer perception of the moral law in the events of human experience. Man's view of the nature of his god or gods is always analogous to his conception of right and wrong, and we could therefore not accept Professor Tiele's opinion, that "the development of the ethical sentiment is a very different matter."

We need not enter into further details, but conclude with a few quotations

from the chapter "Philosophy and Religious Doctrine." Professor Tiele says: "Religion begins with conceptions awakened by emotions and experiences, and "these conceptions produce definite sentiments, which were already present in "germ in the first religious emotions, but which can only be aroused to consciousness by these conceptions; and these sentiments manifest themselves in actions. "But all this is spontaneous, and originally at least it was not the result of conscious reflexion. Reflexion comes on the scene at a later period, on a higher "stage of development, and consciously frames its creed or doctrine of faith."

As to the alleged conflict between philosophy and religion Professor Tiele says: "Their dissensions often arise from misunderstanding, from the confounding of a specific and temporary form of religion with religion itself. Philosophers "oppose religion because they are unable to distinguish it from the conceptions in "which it presents itself to them, or to comprehend that these conceptions are "merely an ephemeral garb; and they do not take the trouble to penetrate to the "ineradicable needs of the human soul which are revealed in these conceptions. "Theologians, laboring under a similar misconception, regard philosophy as an "enemy of religion, because it subjects to criticism the poetic and philosophic "forms, the myths and dogmas in which religion expresses itself, and do not perceive that it thus in reality conduces to the purification and the development of "religion. But the principal cause of these dissensions is a different one. It consists in the difference of development which often subsists between the two. Philosophy continues its researches without intermission. Religious doctrine, on "the other hand—and here I allude not to philosophic theologians and religious "thinkers, but solely to organised communities—remains stationary for long periods. For a long time elapses before the need of revision is felt. Whatever it has "appropriated from philosophy and science, its knowledge of nature and mankind "the physiology and psychology by which its conceptions are connected, all belong "to a period long since elapsed. In this respect, therefore, it lags behind philosophy. In so far as its garb is concerned, it stands upon an obsolete platform. "And, instead of trying to vindicate its position with great persistence, but always "unsuccessfully, and thus injuring rather than promoting religion, it would do "well to bring its conceptions aud arguments into harmony with the more accurate "knowledge and clearer insight attained in modern times. Nor in doing so would "it require to abandon a single jot of the essence of belief. Philosophy and religious doctrine must, therefore, ever continue in mutual intercourse. Philosophy "must not be content to criticise religion and faith, or perhaps to condemn them "on account of an obsolete doctrine which may happen once to have been officially "recognised in one communion or another, and accepted by the multitude without "much reflexion, but which has long since been modified by earnest seekers of "religious truth and brought into harmony with the demands of religious souls "and of general spiritual development. Religious doctrine, on the other hand,

"must not come into conflict with what has been ascertained and established in "other domains, whether moral, scientific, or philosophical."

From the bottom of our heart we say, Amen! These sentences from one of the most prominent theologians of to-day express exactly the position which we have taken in both magazines, *The Open Court* and *The Monist*, and which we have defended and advanced in all our publications. Whatever disagreements we may have with Professor Tiele in definitions or in the formulation of laws such as determine the development of religion, we know ourselves to be in full sympathy with him concerning the maxims of treating religion, and take the same attitude as to the fundamental principle of theology as a science. P. C.

TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE MÉCANIQUE CHIMIQUE, FONDÉE SUR LA THERMODYNAMIQUE. By *P. Duhem*, Professor of Theoretical Physics in the Faculty of Sciences at Bordeaux. Tome III. Les mélanges homogènes; les dissolutions. Large octavo. Paris: A. Hermann. 1898. 380 pages.

Physical chemistry, or at least the mathematical theory of the subject, is known in France as "chemical mechanics." In the present large work by Duhem, it is treated as a branch of thermodynamics, or, rather, as a branch of the general energy theory. The object of the energy theory is to describe the mutual transformations of work and the work-equivalents of effects that are producible by the expenditure of work. Its adequateness to this end makes it the most serviceable method we have for the study of physical chemistry; for chemical phenomena, in their physical aspect, may be regarded as interchanges of work and thermal, electric, and chemical work-equivalents.

A very complete description, in particular, of the more or less complicated states of equilibrium to which chemical changes lead, is supplied by the energy theory. For, a fundamental theorem of the theory assigns the direction in which spontaneous processes proceed under given conditions; and herefrom it is possible to deduct at once the characteristics of the resulting states of equilibrium. The development of the thermodynamic theory of chemical equilibrium is due, in the main, to our countryman J. Willard Gibbs. The labors of Duhem have served to amplify it, and to develop some of its more remote consequences.

In arranging his material, Duhem follows, roughly, the historical order. He presents first the fundamental principles of thermodynamics; then the thermodynamic behavior of single substances, i. e., the phenomena of vaporisation, fusion, the transformation of allotropic forms, and the continuity of liquid and acriform states; and, finally, in the present third volume, the newer theory of the physical behavior of solutions. A fourth volume, yet to appear, is to complete the whole.

This book of Duhem is the first serious attempt that has been made to produce a comprehensive treatise on mathematical chemistry. It is fortunate that the task has been undertaken by so competent a man. And it is a great convenience to the